Posted August 17, 2017 at 6:37am by iClarified · 80094 views
Hacker xerub has posted the decryption key for Apple's Secure Enclave Processor (SEP) firmware.
The security coprocessor was introduced alongside the iPhone 5s and Touch ID. It performs secure services for the rest of the SOC and prevents the main processor from getting direct access to sensitive data. It runs its own operating system (SEPOS) which includes a kernel, drivers, services, and applications.
The Secure Enclave is responsible for processing fingerprint data from the Touch ID sensor, determining if there is a match against registered fingerprints, and then enabling access or purchases on behalf of the user. Communication between the processor and the Touch ID sensor takes place over a serial peripheral interface bus. The processor forwards the data to the Secure Enclave but can’t read it. It’s encrypted and authenticated with a session key that is negotiated using the device’s shared key that is provisioned for the Touch ID sensor and the Secure Enclave. The session key exchange uses AES key wrapping with both sides providing a random key that establishes the session key and uses AES-CCM transport encryption
Today, xerub announced the decryption key 'is fully grown'. You can use img4lib to decrypt the firmware and xerub's SEP firmware split tool to process.
Decryption of the SEP Firmware will make it easier for hackers and security researchers to comb through the SEP for vulnerabilities.
You can find the decryption key at the link below. Please follow iClarified on Twitter, Facebook, or RSS for updates.
No biggie with this finding and public release, an update can and will close the hole. Apple Pay is a huge deal for everyone involved, the SEP has to stay impenetrable. In my opinion, the SEP should've never been touched since there's already access to the NFC chip, it's doable tho.
Most of the comments you seem to be from people that do not understand what has been published yes Apple Pride themselves on security and compare to many other companies such as Samsung products Touch ID and the processor used to process the information related to it has been out for around four years and this is the first time something like this has been published that’s pretty good Apple can easily patch this via the update
Imagine the Secure Enclave as a vault. Apple hung a big, dark curtain over it to prevent anyone from even seeing the vault. Now, that curtain has been opened and people can see the vault. The vault, however, is still locked as securely as ever. No one has broken into it and no one has even gotten any closer to breaking into it.
That is how security works. We have no idea if others have done it and kept it hidden for nefarious reasons. This also enables more people to check for exploits.
Every device has the same base key used in the same process.
If one guy can discover this, then the "security" of that entire system, from the fancy sensors to the security processor itself, is useless against actual targeted attacks.
Publishing the key: a) makes it easy to prove he's actually done it, b) prompts Apple to secure their system better and change a key that ANYONE could discover but which secures all their products, c) makes it possible to analyse the protocol that's hidden behind the key for stupid and obvious vulnerabilities (e.g. things Apple might have hoped nobody would ever discover because they wouldn't know the key), d) allows third-party repairs and components to Apple devices (at least, the potential for, temporarily, until they update it).
Honestly, NOT publishing it isn't doing anyone any favours. Anyone who wanted to could read his method and follow the same path to get the same keys. Anyone who has the key now will be required to change it (if Apple have half-a-brain).
It's like saying "Why publish the CSS key for DVD playback?" - because it's not "secure" at all, proven by the fact that someone obtained the key, and anyone with the same amount of technical skill could do the same and put it on the web or secretly use it against you too.
Rather than "security by obscurity" (i.e. let's pretend it never happened and try to scrub all traces of the key from the Internet), when a key is compromised, it should be revoked, reissued, and the design reconfigured so that it's not as easy to compromise the next device. Otherwise you are quite literally just saying "Sshh, we know it's useless, security-wise.... don't tell anyone!".
Once the hardware encryption keys are compromised, there's nothing Apple can do besides change the way the keys are decrypted on the iPhone 8, because it's not software it can't be updated in a software patch.
It can. The package only has to be signed by the master key, same as an IPSW package for the general OS.
Updating the SE is ultimately not more complicated than updating the baseband.